

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08STATE2034, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): RESULTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08STATE2034**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08STATE2034	2008-01-08 20:42	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.tanea.gr>

R 082042Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ASTANA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MINSK
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA

AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 002034

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR EST:H. SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2033

TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [KSCA](#) [TSPA](#) [FR](#) [GR](#)

SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): RESULTS
OF THE NOVEMBER 5-9, 2007 ATHENS PLENARY (C)

REF: 07 STATE 156270

Classified By: ISN DAS Donald A. Mahley.
Reason: 1.4 (B), (D). H).

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the November 5-9, 2007 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary meeting in Athens, the 34 MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening missile-related export controls and thereby discouraging missile activities and programs of concern. They discussed trends in missile development worldwide, including the rapid changes in technology which require the MTCR to continuously adapt to keep pace with the evolving missile threat, and reiterated their concerns about the serious threat posed by the growing risk of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The MTCR Partners noted that regional missile proliferation continues to be a serious problem and expressed particular concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. They also expressed their determination to exercise vigilance and prevent transfers of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD ballistic missile programs of proliferation concern and called on all States to fully and effectively implement the relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 1737, and 1747.

¶2. (C) The Partners also held in-depth discussions) in both the Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) and the Plenary) on a U.S. proposal to modify how the Regime controls Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles. The majority of the Partners supported the proposal, but the Partners were not able to agree to adopt it. Russia led the opposition, proposing as an alternative a comprehensive, zero-based review of the Regime's control criteria, goals, and purpose so that Russia and other Partners that were not present when the MTCR was established in 1987 could have a hand in shaping the basic parameters of the Regime. Brazil and South Africa both continued to reserve on the proposal.

¶3. (C) During the TEM, the Partners adopted a number of changes to the MTCR Annex (control list) to keep pace with technological advances and trends in proliferation procurement. At the Law Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM), Partners exchanged information on best practices and recent efforts in interdiction. They also agreed to continue their efforts to update the law enforcement experts handbook. The Partners also shared information on priority developments in missile proliferation and engaged in an extremely substantive and productive Information Exchange (IE) session.

¶4. (C) No new members were admitted to the Regime at Athens. However, the Partners agreed on a broad spectrum of contacts with non-members concerning the missile proliferation threat and the MTCR's goals and activities.

END SUMMARY.

¶5. (C) KEY PLENARY OUTCOMES:

--Partners agreed to exercise vigilance against the export to Iran of listed items, materials, goods and technology, consistent with UNSCRs 1696 and 1737. They also took note of U.S. information on Iranian front companies relevant to these efforts.

--Partners reiterated their support for UNSCR 1540 and agreed the MTCR Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.

--Partners adopted a U.S. proposal on outreach to non-members. Specifically, Partners were encouraged to use their national outreach efforts to actively encourage non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis.

--Partners also agreed that the MTCR Chair, with assistance from the TEM Chair, should inform non-Partner countries of changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, with a view to facilitating the widest possible application of these documents and enabling interested non-Partners to harmonize their controls with MTCR standards.

--Partners agreed to a 45-day silence procedure regarding a German proposal on suggested best practices for sharing and using Regime denial information.

--Partners agreed to a number of changes to the MTCR Annex, including an amendment of the payload definition for &other UAVs;8 creation of a new control for an oxidizer substance usable in solid propellant rocket motors (Item 4.C.4.b.5); adoption of strengthened controls for environmental chambers; and clarification of the control text for two polymeric substances and a technical note for maraging steels.

--Partners agreed on the utility of holding a joint session of the IE, LEEM, and TEM at future Plenary meetings.

--Partners reaffirmed their agreement to update the MTCR Enforcement Officers Handbook. This project will be coordinated by Canada.

--Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting in Paris no later than April 2008.

--Partners accepted Australia,s offer to host/chair the Plenary in 2008 Plenary, and to serve as MTCR Chair in 2008-2009.

/////////
Opening Statements
/////////

¶6. (C) Following the formal opening of the Plenary on November 5 by outgoing Danish Chairman Ambassador Per Fischer, the MTCR Partners confirmed Ambassador Eleftherios Danellis as the 2007 MTCR Chair. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary General for European Affairs Dimitrios Katsoudas then delivered opening remarks. Portugal (on behalf of the EU states participating in the MTCR and Norway), the Russian Federation, Australia, Japan, and Turkey also made opening statements.

¶7. (C) During his remarks, Secretary General Katsoudas stressed the importance of further strengthening the MTCR as a means for helping to maintain regional security and stability, and the need for the MTCR Partners to underscore their commitment to implementing fully and effectively all missile nonproliferation-relevant UNSCRs. He also noted the importance of focusing on the proliferant activities of non-state actors as well as countries with programs of concern.

¶8. (C) The EU statement lauded the Regime for its contributions over the past twenty years in slowing or halting missile development programs around the world and its work in establishing a standard for responsible missile nonproliferation behavior. The EU also stressed the

commitment of all EU countries to missile nonproliferation and urged Partners to search for new ways to further strengthen the MTCR,s effectiveness. In particular, the EU urged that additional emphasis be placed on outreach to non-members and to admitting countries with long-pending applications to membership in the Regime, e.g., Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Finally, the EU urged enhanced support by the MTCR to the UNSCR 1540 Committee and recommended adoption of an EU proposal to give special attention to a &Watch List8 of items of particular utility to the Iranian missile program.

¶9. (C) Russia said that missile nonproliferation and strengthening the MTCR are among its top foreign policy priorities and cited Russia,s initiative to universalize the INF Treaty as an example of its commitment to missile nonproliferation. Russia also wished to increase the Regime,s effectiveness to adapt to &new realities and technology challenges,8 and suggested that it might be time for the Regime to re-evaluate the basic parameters of the Regime, to assess the global missile threat, and then to collectively identify how to shape the Regime to address the threat, including by adjusting the control parameters.

¶10. (C) Russia also noted that in its view the Regime would only be &functional8 when it admits those countries that are actively developing missile and space programs. Russia therefore hoped the Regime would increase its outreach efforts with that goal in mind. Additionally, Russia urged that Partners not try to single out any one country as a bad proliferator but to take a regional approach to nonproliferation. Additionally, Russia reminded Partners that the MTCR is not a sanctions Regime and said Russia would not favor actions that attempt to duplicate or extend the work of the UN Security Council. Finally, Russia called on the MTCR to continue its cooperation with the 1540 Committee.

¶11. (C) Japan stressed the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran,s and North Korea,s missile programs. It also underscored the need for the MTCR Partners to act in concert and implement the measures outlined in relevant UNSCRs as a way to prevent the transfer to/from Iran and North Korea of WMD-related goods and technology.

¶12. (C) Turkey agreed and said it had taken note of what had been said about Iran and North Korea in the IE and LEEM. Turkey also thought the MTCR needed to have &practical applications8 if it were to be useful. Additionally, Turkey noted that it hoped issues with Iran would be resolved by diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations for peace in the region and the Middle East.

¶13. (SBU) Australia looked forward to a productive Plenary and hoped the Partners would give favorable consideration to Australia,s proposal to host the Plenary in 2008 and serve as MTCR Chair.

////////////////////////////////////
Report on the Danish MTCR Chairmanship
////////////////////////////////////

¶14. (C) Outgoing MTCR Chair Per Fischer read verbatim a 16-page, written report on his tenure (the report also was circulated to all Partners). Fischer noted that the Chair had engaged in a number of outreach activities to promote the MTCR and to remind non-Partners of the need for all countries to implement and enforce effective missile export controls. The Chair's outreach activities had included leading MTCR missions to several non-Partner countries, as well as participation in seminars, regional fora, and other multilateral meetings. All of these activities helped to enhance understanding of the goals and activities of the Regime. They also have helped to maintain and improve relations with countries like India, Israel, Pakistan, and China.

¶15. (C) Fischer noted that outreach was becoming increasingly important as more countries outside of the

Regime become developers, producers, or traders of missile technology, and urged Partners to follow his lead and make the technical aspects of the Regime an integral part of any outreach activities. Explaining to non-Partners what the MTCR controls and why) and discussing how the Partners implement MTCR controls on a day-to-day basis) has been critical to the success of the Chair,s outreach activities in 2007. It also has helped build a better understanding of the Regime,s goals. Finally, Fischer strongly urged Partners to consider systematically informing the 1540 Committee and other interested parties of changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex directly after they have been decided at a Plenary.

¶16. (C) The Plenary thanked Ambassador Fischer for his extremely detailed report and excellent work during the past year on behalf of the Regime. However, while acknowledging Chairman Fischer outstanding efforts, Russia raised concerns about Fischer,s participation in a NATO-sponsored event in Lithuania. Fischer responded that he had announced his intention to represent the MTCR at the seminar via his report to all Partners on planned outreach events. No Partner raised objections. Consequently, per established practice, Fischer had agreement to pursue the activities described in his outreach plan. Russia thanked Fischer for the explanation and undertook to pay closer attention in the future to documents circulated by the Chair. South Africa added that it would do likewise.

////////////////////
Report of the French MTCR POC
////////////////////

¶17. (C) France briefly summarized the activities of the MTCR Point of Contact (POC) during the preceding year. It reported that the POC had circulated 274 documents to Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary. The POC also had updated the Compendium of Consensus Decisions, and hoped to distribute it soon. In addition, the POC had continued to develop the "ePOC" computerized document distribution system for the MTCR; organized five meetings of the MTCR country representatives in Paris; and hosted the RPOC meeting in April 2007.

¶18. (C) The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report. They also thanked the POC) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for its invaluable services on behalf of the Regime.

////////////////////
Report of the April 2007 Reinforced
Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting
////////////////////

¶19. (C) The POC reported on the results of the April 2007 RPOC meeting in Paris, noting that outreach to non-Partners and relevant organizations had been a major focus of discussion. In addition, RPOC participants had exchanged views on the current state of ballistic missile-related proliferation worldwide, with most contributors centering on Iran, and agreed to discuss these issues further at the 2007 Plenary. The RPOC also considered a German proposal on end-use controls and denial notifications, and agreed to continue discussing membership issues at the 2007 Plenary. Finally, the Partners confirmed Greece as the 2007 Plenary chair/host and subsequent MTCR Chair.

¶20. (C) The Partners thanked France for hosting the 2007 RPOC and endorsed the RPOC report (POC 133). They also accepted France's proposal to host the next RPOC in Paris before the end of April 2008.

/////////
EPOC Update
/////////

¶21. (C) The POC reported on the continued development of the ePOC8 computerized information distribution system for

the MTCR. 29 of 34 MTCR countries currently can access ePOC, and there are 246 registered users. This is nearly double the number of registered users reported at the 2006 Copenhagen Plenary. The POC invited all Partners to begin using ePOC regularly as this would increase efficiency. Ideally, the POC would like to see generalized use of the ePOC by the time of the 2008 RPOC meeting and hoped that the Regime will soon go paperless.

¶22. (C) Germany thanked the POC for its continuing efforts to improve the ePOC. The UK also applauded the POC,s Herculean efforts on behalf of the Regime and noted that HMG has 18 registered ePOC users. The U.S. welcomed and appreciated the POC,s efforts to develop ePOC, and liked the idea of a paperless Regime. However, the U.S. noted that ePOC can only handle documents up to the confidential level. Higher level documents must be circulated in paper copy. While the U.S. will continue to try to develop papers at the confidential level, the nature of the MTCR is that some issues are more sensitive and need to be distributed in paper copy. The U.S. hoped that the POC would continue to circulate paper copies of such documents. The POC responded that this practice would continue to be followed.

¶23. (C) The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report on ePOC, inviting Partners that have not yet signed up for ePOC to do so soon. The Partners also renewed the POC,s mandate to continue ePOC operations and agreed by consensus on the following:

&The Plenary entrusted the POC with the mandate to continue ePOC operations. The Plenary expressed its satisfaction at the current level of security of the ePOC, which was deemed to strike a satisfactory balance between security and user-friendliness.⁸

////////////////////
Contact with Non-Partners
////////////////////

¶24. (C) Germany, Portugal (on behalf of the EU), the ROK, and the U.S. reported on their bilateral and regional contacts with non-Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary. Several countries, including the United States (POC 198), also circulated written reports on their contacts with non-Partners. However, Russia commented that too much time was being devoted to outreach) a topic that Russia considered to be a &secondary issue⁸) and said that it would pay closer attention to the Plenary agenda in the future to ensure that outreach was given sufficient but not undue attention. The Greek Chair responded that the Plenary would ignore Russia,s comment: outreach is a key focus of the Regime and is properly placed on the Plenary agenda.

////////////////////
Regional Nonproliferation
////////////////////

Iran
////

¶25. (C) Portugal, on behalf of the EU participating states, presented the EU states, revised proposal for an MTCR watch list on Iran. NOTE: This proposal was previously circulated as POC DOC 61. It was discussed at the April 2007 RPOC, but failed to achieve consensus. It was subsequently subjected to a silence procedure, which failed when Russia broke silence (POC 112). END NOTE. Portugal explained that the proposed watch list contained items that EU experts believe deserve special attention either because they have been observed to be items Iranian end-users of concern are attempting to acquire or because they are assessed to be chokepoints for the Iranian missile program. The proposal was not intended to expand UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 or the MTCR Annex and would not impose punitive measures on Iran. Rather, the EU states view the watch list as a tool that could help MTCR Partner countries implement relevant UNSCRs.

¶26. (C) The U.S. greatly appreciated the EU proposal as an effort to focus Partner attention on key technologies Iranian end-users of concern are seeking. The U.S. also reminded Partners that the U.S. had circulated a complementary proposal on Iranian Front Companies as POC 190, and urged Partners to consider the two proposals in tandem.

¶27. (C) Turkey supported the EU proposal. Portugal expressed support for the U.S. proposal. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, and Spain all endorsed both proposals. Ukraine said it supported the EU proposal in principal but wanted more time to review the watch list. Ukraine also thought the Partners should consider whether to amend the MTCR Annex to control the items included on the proposed watch list.

¶28. (C) South Africa appreciated the Partners' interest in discussing how to respond to missile proliferation and regional developments. However, in South Africa's view, the Regime needed to take a comprehensive approach and focus on broad regional issues, not just one country. Thus far the Regime has been focusing on two proposals that relate to UN Security Council action on Iran as it pertains to WMD delivery systems. However, the Security Council also has taken action on North Korea, so the MTCR should not focus only on Iran. Additionally, South Africa said the MTCR must remember that it is not the UNSC. The Security Council has committees that implement its resolutions, and any decision to expand the lists associated with the UNSCRs should be done by these committees. The MTCR is on dangerous ground when it tries to reinterpret or add to what the Security Council has done.

¶29. (C) With regard to the EU and U.S. proposals, South Africa noted that they relate to information derived from the Information Exchange (IE) and suggested the Partners simply take note of the relevant IE information. In the end, South Africa said, all MTCR Partners have national obligations to implement the relevant UNSCRs. Therefore, South Africa is not convinced the MTCR needs to adopt additional lists to build on or expand the relevant UNSCRs.

¶30. (C) Noting that Russia is a member of the Security Council, Russia agreed that the MTCR should not try to expand the Security Council's work. Russia further noted that the UNSCRs already are obligatory and legally binding on all UN members, and that is sufficient. Russia also stressed that the MTCR is not an implementation body of the UN and should not be used as such, nor should it be used as a sanctions body. In Russia's view, the MTCR is an export control regime and nothing more.

¶31. (C) Continuing, Russia said its review of the EU proposal had uncovered no value added.⁸ Instead, Russia had concluded that the proposal raised a number of questions. In particular, Russia questioned whether the proposed watch list represented all items of concern with regard to the Iranian missile program. Russia also wondered why the EU did not submit proposals to the TEM to add these items to the MTCR Annex. In addition, Russia was concerned that having such a watch list would undermine the Regime's catch-all controls. However, in the spirit of constructiveness and consistency, Russia offered that it would be willing to combine the U.S. and EU proposals and simply take note of the lists of Iranian Front Companies and dual-use technologies. In Russia's view, these lists then could be used to inform Partners' national export licensing processes.

¶32. (C) The UK supported the U.S. and EU proposals. It noted that while the MTCR is not a UN enforcement agency, it also does not operate in a vacuum. Partners come to the Plenary to exchange information, discuss developments, and decide what they can do to deal with actual events taking place in the real world. In the UK's view, both proposals directly furthered these objectives. Italy concurred, stressing that Partners understand perfectly well that the MTCR is not the UN but that they have a special responsibility as producers and exporters of missile

technology to exercise vigilance with regard to missile proliferation.

¶33. (C) The U.S. agreed that the MTCR is not a UN implementing body. However, all MTCR Partners are responsible for implementing UNSCRs on a national basis. Nobody has disputed that, nor should they. Consequently, it is appropriate for the MTCR Partners to consider measures, such as those proposed in the U.S. and EU proposals, that would assist Partners in their national implementation of missile-relevant UNSCRs. At the 2006 Copenhagen Plenary, the Partners took the following decision:

&Consistent with UNSCR 1696, MTCR Partners agreed, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation, to exercise vigilance against the export to Iran of any items, materials, goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran's ballistic missile programs.⁸

There is no reason why the Partners could not at least affirm that decision in Athens and also note that the EU and the U.S. had provided relevant information to the Partners to assist them in carrying out this undertaking.

¶34. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Chair deferred further discussion of the two proposals to the Heads of Delegation. Following additional consideration by the HODs, the Plenary agreed to the following consensus language:

&The MTCR Partners take note of the attached watch list and will exercise, in accordance with their national legislation and international obligations, vigilance against the export to Iran of those listed items, materials, goods, and technology consistent with UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006). In this context, Partners also noted the information from the United States on front companies in Iran relevant to these endeavours.⁸

North Korea
//////////

¶35. (C) Japan reminded Partners that North Korea remained a cause for concern. Although there had been no significant new developments on the North Korean missile front in the past year, Japan said Partners needed to maintain their vigilance. Japan also urged Partners to vigorously implement the UNSCRs on North Korea so as to force North Korea to take some positive steps in the missile area.

//////////
Outreach
//////////

¶36. (C) The U.S. introduced its proposal on outreach to non-Partners (POC 187), stressing the importance of cooperation with non-members on missile nonproliferation issues. In view of the ongoing global missile proliferation threat, the U.S. said outreach is a critical mission of the MTCR and Partners need to work side-by-side with non-Partners to actively encourage their support for the Regime's efforts, including by implementing the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis.

¶37. (C) Through national implementation of the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, non-Partners can make a significant contribution to the growing multilateral effort to stem missile proliferation worldwide. As more countries establish national controls consistent with MTCR standards, it will become increasingly costly, difficult, and time consuming for programs of concern to obtain missile-useful equipment and technology. In addition, by implementing the MTCR Guidelines and having a legally-based system to control exports of MTCR Annex items, non-Partner countries can help minimize the risk that their economies and exports (or the passage of goods through their territories) will be used to aid proliferant missile programs, either directly or indirectly. Taking such action also would help to further the Regime's longstanding goal of preventing the proliferation of unmanned delivery

systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction -- and related equipment and technology. It also would assist non-Partner countries in meeting their export control obligations under UNSCR 1540.

¶38. (C) The U.S. therefore had developed a proposal that would have Partners agree that during their outreach activities in 2007-2008, they would make a more focused effort to encourage non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis, while also stressing the importance of taking measures to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The U.S. hoped the Partners would adopt the proposal in Athens.

¶39. (C) South Africa reminded Partners that during the Plenary,s previous discussion on regional issues, South Africa talked about the need to look more carefully at the mandate for, and scope of, the Regime,s outreach activities. South Africa believes the Partners need to be clear about the focus of their efforts and the focus of the Chair,s efforts, to include the establishment of specific goals and objectives. Once the Partners have identified what they want to achieve, then organizing outreach activities will be rather straightforward.

¶40. (C) In South Africa,s view, outreach should focus on export controls and the Regime,s basic documents) the MTCR Guidelines and Annex. Discussion of the missile threat or specific activities of proliferation concern should be conducted by Partners with relevant non-Partners on a national basis and in a confidential manner. In addition, South Africa said Partners need to be careful not to create misimpressions or false expectations when they discuss the MTCR with non-members.

¶41. (C) Brazil noted that outreach is a way for the Regime to pass a message to non-members. As evident from Per Fischer,s detailed report, outreach has become increasingly important for the MTCR over the past five years, and Partners need to work together to convey a consistent message. In this context, while Brazil does not have a systematic approach to national outreach activities, it is prepared to work with the U.S. on its proposal.

¶42. (C) The Netherlands pointed out that the thrust of the U.S. proposal is what Partners can do on an individual basis to reach non-members. This is a different discussion from the discussion of the mandate for the Chairman. In any case, the Netherlands supported the U.S. proposal. With regard to the Chairman,s mandate, the Netherlands thought Partners needed to build in some flexibility and trust for the Chair.

¶43. (C) The ROK agreed with the Netherlands on the need to give the Chair flexibility. The ROK did not want to place undue stress on the Chair by making his mandate too narrow and also wanted to give the Chair flexibility in terms of the composition of his delegation. The ROK supported the U.S. proposal.

¶44. (C) Outgoing Chair Fischer reminded Partners that they had agreed on an outreach mandate for the Chair at the Copenhagen Plenary. It is very clear (Fischer read it aloud), and should be continued. Fischer noted that the mandate does not give the Chair the authority to negotiate with non-Partners nor does it authorize him to talk about the results of the IE or about the HCOC. Rather, it allows the Chair to update non-Partners on key issues such as changes to the MTCR Annex.

¶45. (C) Fischer noted that participation in the Chair,s outreach activities is open to all Partners, and encouraged Partners to send representatives from capitals to participate in these events. He further noted that the fact of the IE Chair,s inclusion in an outreach delegation did not mean that the delegation was sharing Regime-confidential information. All Partners that want to participate in Regime outreach should be encouraged to do so. In terms of the mandate and format for outreach activities, Fischer thought

Partners should tailor their approach to each country they visit.

¶46. (C) Poland supported the U.S. proposal, and agreed with the views expressed by the Netherlands, the ROK, and Per Fischer on the outreach process. Poland also thought the Partners should talk more about target countries and outreach priorities, including perhaps inviting non-Partners to seminars on relevant missile issues.

¶47. (C) Russia complained that Partners were spending too much time talking about outreach. Russia wanted to discuss substance,⁸ and did not want Athens to be known as the Outreach Plenary.⁸ Russia also disagreed that the Chair should have flexibility. In Russia's view, the Chair should be imprisoned⁸ by his message. The Chair must represent the unique voice of the MTCR and not provide misinformation) as was done in the past with China) or sensitive information) as was done in the past with Israel.

Additionally, the Regime should prioritize outreach activities and develop a limited mandate, as well as specific modalities for outreach visits. In Russia's view, the countries that should be at the top of the list for outreach are countries that are important players on missile issues, including Belarus, China, and Kazakhstan.

¶48. (C) Russia agreed that the general mandate for the Chair that was adopted in Copenhagen should continue. However, Russia stressed that the Chair should not be able to discuss issues &willy nilly⁸ and did not have the freedom to talk about HCOC, UNSCR 1540, or specific nonproliferation concerns. In Russia's view, the MTCR is a technical body that should stick to discussing technical issues such as changes to the MTCR Annex. For that reason, Russia would support including the TEM Chair on outreach activities. Russia also believed that the Partners need to reach consensus agreement on each of the Chair's outreach activities and to set priorities.

¶49. (C) The U.S. thought the Copenhagen mandate for the Chair was adequate and should be reaffirmed. The composition of specific delegations should be up to the Chair. The U.S. also thought Partners needed to be purposeful and intentional during their outreach activities.

¶50. (C) South Africa agreed that outreach is important. As the only Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country present, South Africa also wanted to point out to Partners the need to approach outreach with the necessary sensitivity to ensure the Regime is not seen poorly or seen as restricting technology to countries that need new technology for development. South Africa supported Outgoing Chair Fischer's ideas on outreach. It also supported reaffirming the Chairman's mandate established at Copenhagen. However, South Africa had some concerns with regard to the composition of the Regime's outreach teams. In South Africa's view, the teams must represent the MTCR, not their national points of view. Therefore, it might be best to have only the Chair and heads of the working groups (i.e., the TEM) on the delegation.

¶51. (C) South Africa said it could support the U.S. proposal on outreach provided the proposed outreach was voluntary, not mandatory. It also requested changes to the proposed consensus language. The U.S. was disappointed that some Partners were confusing the Regime's interest in preventing missile proliferation with national positions. However, in the spirit of cooperation and flexibility, the U.S. accepted South Africa's proposed changes. The Plenary then adopted the following consensus language with respect to the U.S. proposal:

&Partners encourage the use of national outreach efforts with non-Partners to actively encourage these countries to take steps to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis. Partners are invited to share the results of these outreach efforts at the 2008 MTCR RPOC and/or Plenary meetings.⁸

////////////////////////////////////
Outreach Priorities and Contact with
the UN 1540 Committee
////////////////////////////////////

¶52. (C) The U.S. said Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore, and the UAE should be priorities for Regime outreach. Not all of these countries have missile programs. However, missile possession is not the only reason for outreach. Some of these countries are now, or could be, potential transshipment points. Given the Regime,s increased concern about proliferators using transshipment points to evade MTCR export controls, reaching out to these countries early and often will help promote the Regime,s broader nonproliferation goals.

¶53. (C) South Africa reiterated its support for the Copenhagen mandate for the Chair and suggested that the Chair circulate a proposed outreach plan for Partner consideration. Russia agreed. Russia also thought that technical outreach by the MTCR could be helpful to countries needing assistance with UNSCR 1540 implementation. South Africa said it would have no problem informing the 1540 Committee of relevant MTCR activities but would like more information on any proposal to enhance cooperation with the 1540 Committee. Russia clarified that it was simply suggesting that it would be useful if the MTCR Chair could represent the MTCR community at seminars organized by the 1540 Committee.

¶54. (C) After further discussion by the Heads of Delegation, the Partners agreed to the following additional consensus language with regard to outreach priorities and the Chair,s mandate:

&Partners exchanged views on possible destinations for outreach activities and renewed earlier outreach mandates. The following destinations were proposed: Belarus, China, Croatia, Egypt, Jordan, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya, Panama, Singapore, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

It was agreed that the Chair would prepare and circulate to Partners an outreach programme taking into consideration the above suggestions.

The Plenary agreed that the MTCR Chair, assisted by the TEM Chair, as appropriate, will inform, following Plenary decisions, non-member states, as well as the 1540 Committee, of changes to the Guidelines and Annex for their information and use with a view to facilitating the widest possible application of the latest versions of these instruments and enabling interested non-member states to harmonize their controls with those of MTCR Partners. Contacts with non-member states may also include information on the rationale for changes to the Annex, while respecting the principle of confidentiality within the MTCR.8

¶55. (C) The Partners also agreed on the following consensus language concerning contact with the UNSCR 1540 Committee:

&Partners reiterated their support for UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Plenary agreed that the Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.8

////
HCOC
////

¶56. (C) Austria, as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) gave a brief report of HCOC developments since the last MTCR Plenary. It reported that HCOC membership stood at 127 and that Bosnia-Herzegovina was the current HCOC Chair. Hungary will Chair in 2008. Austria said that at their annual meeting in Vienna, the HCOC Subscribing States had discussed the importance of all participants submitting annual declarations. There also was detailed discussion of prelaunch notifications and the need

to promote universalization of the HCOC. However, there was no agreement to pursue a UN resolution on the HCOC in 2007.

¶57. (C) Russia thanked Austria for the report but objected to HCOC being discussed in the MTCR. Russia said that while it is a strong supporter of the HCOC, the HCOC has problems, and these problems should be discussed at the HCOC annual meeting, not the MTCR Plenary. If HCOC is discussed at all during Plenary week, it should be at the Information Exchange. Outgoing Chair Fischer disagreed, noting that the Plenary needs to be aware of ongoing developments in the missile area.

/////////
Membership
/////////

¶58. (C) The U.S. said its position on membership is well-established: the U.S. does not support membership for China, Croatia, or Kazakhstan. None of these countries meet the established criteria for membership.

¶59. (C) Turkey said its views also are well known. As stated at the last two Plenaries, Turkey does not support MTCR membership for Cyprus. Greece reiterated its view that Cyprus should be a member of the Regime and that it is totally inappropriate for any Partner to oppose the membership of any of the EU countries that are not yet members.

¶60. (C) Russia said the Partners know very well how Russia views the membership issues. Although Partners think there is a political motivation for the Russian position, Russia,s position is really about strengthening the MTCR,s ability to control missile proliferation. Right now, the MTCR is limited in its ability to do this because its membership is too narrow. In Russia,s view, the Partners should open up the MTCR to countries that possess significant missile technology so that Regime members are countries that can really contribute to missile nonproliferation. Russia therefore supports membership for China and Kazakhstan.

¶61. (C) The ROK welcomed membership for countries that meet the MTCR criteria and factors for consideration established in 1991 and 1993, but needed more time to review individual applications to determine if there were any such countries. Brazil shared the ROK view.

¶62. (C) Portugal reminded Partners that the EU countries supported membership for Croatia and all of the new EU countries, and had no objection to membership for Kazakhstan. Ukraine associated itself with the EU position.

¶63. (C) The U.S. noted that there clearly was not consensus on China and Kazakhstan and that if those were the only two applicants that Russia supported, then there was no consensus on any applications and no need for further discussion of this topic in Athens. Russia agreed.

¶64. (C) The Partners agreed on the following consensus language on membership:

&The Plenary considered applications for MTCR membership submitted by Croatia, Romania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, People,s Republic of China, and Libya. As on previous occasions, Partners were not in a position to reach consensus on these applications and agreed to continue examination of all candidatures on a case-by-case basis. The Chair was mandated to convey to each candidate country that no consensus was reached in this Plenary.⁸

////////////////////////////////////
UK Proposal on Payload Substitution
////////////////////////////////////

¶65. (C) The UK introduced its proposal (POC 179) to amend the MTCR Guidelines to make the ability to augment or

substitute authorized payloads on re-usable UAV systems for the purposes of the WMD delivery a factor for consideration when reviewing export license requests. The UK noted that as the commercial market for UAVs grows, so does the risk of unauthorized payload substitution. For this reason, the UK believes Partners should routinely consider the risk that a system may be misused for WMD proliferation as part of the licensing review process. The UK proposal is not intended to impede legitimate trade but to address a proliferation concern.

¶66. (C) The U.S. welcomed the UK proposal, noting that as the commercial market for UAVs evolves, so must our shared nonproliferation goals. The UK proposal does this by drawing Partners, attention to another factor for consideration in evaluating the proliferation risk of UAV transfers. Japan agreed that the proposal would help guard against the unauthorized use of UAVs. Australia, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Poland also supported the proposal.

¶67. (C) Russia thought the proposal was important but viewed it in the context of Russia,s idea) as mentioned in its opening statement) for adapting the MTCR to meet new challenges. Russia also argued that nearly everything envisioned in the UK proposal is already covered by the MTCR Guidelines. While Russia shared the concern about UAVs falling into the hands of terrorists and agreed that UAVs would be very dangerous WMD delivery vehicles, Russia was not sure that adding these controls to only one class of vehicles was pertinent and took a very cautious approach to changing the MTCR Guidelines. Such changes to the Regime,s &constitution8 should not be done piecemeal. Instead, Russia believed the Partners needed to undertake a comprehensive review of the Regime,s goals and a broad assessment of the missile threat. Once Partners have those two things, they can decide what parameters they need to establish to deal with the threat. Therefore, while Russia thought it was good to adapt the MTCR to address new challenges, it did not think any action should be taken until there has been a comprehensive review of the Regime.

¶68. (C) The U.S. pointed out that the Partners have been appropriately seized for sometime with the idea that the MTCR needs to adapt and change to account for modifications in technology, changes in the global missile threat, and the imaginative efforts of proliferators. A good deal of work in this area has been done over the years. More recently, the U.S. has worked for the past 18 months on a proposal to modernize Regime controls on UAVs and cruise missiles. But now Russia has suggested that any proposed changes to the MTCR are to be held up until the Partners conduct a radical review of the foundations of the Regime. That is an obstructionist proposal, and will put all Regime efforts on hold until Partners can find a least common denominator solution that will result in controls that are weaker than the current controls. The U.S. will not support even the concept of such a proposal.

¶69. (C) The ROK requested more time to study the UK proposal, noting that it was concerned that the UK proposal would be a roadblock to UAV exports for purely commercial uses. The ROK would be open to revisiting the proposal at a later date.

¶70. (C) The UK noted that it already had been discussing its proposal with Partners for sometime but was willing to consult further. The UK also urged Partners not to take too long as technology does not wait for policy initiatives, it keeps evolving.

¶71. (C) Russia saw no added value to the Regime in the UK proposal. At most, Russia thought the intent of the proposal should be covered in a &best practices8 document. There certainly was not sufficient reason to change the MTCR Guidelines, in Russia,s view.

////////////////////////////////////

U.S. Proposal on UAVs and Cruise Missiles
////////////////////////////////////

172. (C) Remarking that it was making a &free8 intervention inasmuch as one Partner (Russia) has made clear that it would oppose discussion of proposals to strengthen the Regime until the Partners conduct of fundamental review of the MTCR and its control parameters, the U.S. urged Partners to adopt its proposal (POC 171) for modernizing Regime controls on UAVs and cruise missiles. The U.S. believed the proposal correctly addressed critical advances in technology as well as changes in how this technology is used. Moreover, the U.S. has worked with Partners over the past 18 months to refine the proposal, and believes the proposal does what the U.S. intended all along. First, it allows for transfers of the bigger, slower, and less lethal systems that have a number of commercial uses and that would be especially helpful in developing countries. Second, it strengthens controls on highly capable cruise missile systems, and thereby helps to make it more costly, difficult, and time consuming for proliferators and terrorists to obtain these systems. In short, the proposal balances nonproliferation concerns and commercial interests, and the U.S. strongly urges its adoption in Athens.

173. (C) Russia said it was in a very constructive mood but sometimes had a hard time understanding other Partners, positions or explaining Russian views so that Partners could understand them. For example, the U.S. was critical of Russia's stance on its UAV/CM proposal in the Plenary. However, Russia said, as there was no agreement on the proposal at the TEM, it cannot be adopted at the Plenary. But, Russia clarified, that this is not the issue. It is no mystery, Russia said, that the real issue is military defense, not nonproliferation. In Russia's view, military defense and nonproliferation are two different things, and military defense needs should not be discussed in the MTCR. If the issue is really about using supersonic cruise missiles, Russia is ready to assess the cruise missile transfer threat and then assess how the MTCR should respond to it. But what Russia cannot understand is why anybody would be opposed to discussing the missile threat and assessing ways to respond to it. This is something the Partners should want to do so the best controls are in place to deal with the threat.

174. (C) The U.S. responded that the Partners have before them proposals by the U.S. and the UK to modify the MTCR to address new and emerging threats. The U.S. proposal has been worked for 18 months and has achieved the overwhelming support of the majority of Partners. Those Partners recognize the value of the proposal, its utility, and what it means for nonproliferation. The UK proposal has achieved even broader support. Yet, neither proposal can be adopted because one Partner is insisting that the MTCR cannot adopt either proposal until the MTCR conducts a fundamental review of its control parameters. That is not a constructive approach.

175. (C) Poland, Sweden, and the UK all supported the U.S. proposal, as did Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. Poland reminded Partners that export controls are not licensing bans, and there is a real need to address the UAV/CM issue proactively since the IE has demonstrated that certain UAVs and cruise missiles are the &first choice8 of proliferators. Sweden noted that the proposal had been reviewed extensively by the TEM and had improved over time. The UK saw the proposal as a way for the Regime to proactively address the UAV issue.

176. (C) Brazil said the issue of UAVs is of great concern, and the Regime has been presented with conflicting information on this subject. Russia circulated a document on the UAV threat that raises concerns about what should be controlled. On the other hand, there is enormous commercial potential for UAVs and a need for them in areas such as agriculture and forestry. Brazil could see some merit in

Russia,s idea of reviewing the missile threat and then deciding control parameters, but Brazil also could see an immediate need for more stringent controls on UAVs that may have arms. Brazil also indicated that it can support the UK proposal on payload substitution for UAVs.

¶77. (C) Brazil also appreciated U.S. efforts on UAVs and cruise missiles and thanked the U.S. for modifying its proposal to address Partner concerns. Brazil is prepared to continue to work this issue bilaterally with the U.S. but takes a generally positive view of the proposal.

¶78. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Partners agreed to discuss the U.S. and UK proposals again at future MTCR meetings.

////////////////////
Russian Paper on the UAV Threat
////////////////////

¶79. (C) Russia reminded Partners that in 2002, Russia was the last Partner to agree to a U.S. proposal to impose stricter controls on UAVs. This was not because Russia opposed strict controls on UAVs, but because making such a change to the MTCR required Russia to make similar changes to its national export controls and this involves a great deal of work. Nevertheless, this is serious business and as the U.S. pointed out at the time, UAVs represent a serious threat in terms of being used as a delivery vehicle for WMD. What is perplexing, Russia said, is the change in the U.S. position. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. pushed in 2002 for stricter controls on UAVs. Then, just three years later, apparently under the influence of commercial sales interests, the U.S. decided it wanted to change the rules. Russia does not support this.

¶80. (C) Instead, Russia continues to share the concerns raised by the U.S. three or four years ago about the dangers of UAV proliferation and the ease with which terrorists could acquire them. For these reasons, Russia would strongly prefer to keep UAVs under strict control. This is the essence of the Russian paper on the UAV threat (POC 192). Russia hoped that Partners would analyze it very carefully and come to the conclusion that one Partner (the U.S.) did a few years ago: nonproliferation concerns should prevail over commercial interests.

¶81. (C) The UK thanked Russia for its presentation and commented that both the first section of Russia,s paper and the last sentence of the paper are in line with, and seem to support, the UK proposal on payload substitution.

¶82. (C) Russia responded that it is not against the UK proposal per se. The problem is that if a change were made to the MTCR Guidelines, Russia would need to make corresponding changes to its national export control laws. This would require explaining the situation to President Putin himself, and he would need a serious argument as to why Russia,s export controls need to be changed. For these reasons, Russia does not support any changes to the MTCR Guidelines. However, the essence of the UK proposal could be included in a &best practices8 document. Finally, as stated earlier, Russia cannot support individual adjustments to the MTCR until after a comprehensive review of the Regime,s parameters.

¶83. (C) The U.S. agreed that since the conclusions of the Russian paper accorded with the basic tenets of the UK proposal, the UK proposal should be approvable. However, Russia would not approve the proposal because doing so would require extra work nationally. Additionally, Russia would not consider individual changes to the Regime unless and until there is a comprehensive review of the Regime,s control parameters. This in essence means that no individual proposals can be adopted at this time or in the near future. In the U.S. view, this is not a constructive approach.

¶84. (C) Russia said it did not want to debate the issue

with the U.S. because the tenor of the debate was reminiscent of the rhetoric of the 1980s. Russia also thought the U.S. argument about working a particular proposal for 18 months was not a good one because some issues needed to be worked for years before being adopted.

¶85. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Plenary deferred further discussion of this topic to a future meeting.

/////////
Self Assessment
/////////

¶86. (C) Switzerland reminded Partners of the agreement at the 2003 Plenary in Buenos Aires to report on a voluntary basis when they have implemented in their own national export control systems changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex. This information is then to be compiled by the POC and the resulting matrix distributed as a reference document. Switzerland noted that it had not yet seen such a matrix and wondered when it would be distributed.

¶87. (C) The POC responded that very few Partners had made voluntary submissions, and urged all Partners to do so at their earliest opportunity so the POC would have time to develop a matrix for distribution at the 2008 RPOC meeting.

¶88. (C) The U.S. reported that it had provided the requested information to all Partners in POC 116. The ROK said it also had reported via the POC on all Annex changes adopted by the ROKG. Russia said that the changes adopted at the Madrid and Copenhagen Plenaries were implemented by Russia in August 2007 via a presidential decree. Brazil reported that it had updated its control list in March 2007.

/////////
End Use Controls
/////////

¶89. (C) Germany introduced its proposal on end use controls (POC 200) and asked for Partner feedback. Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the ROK, Sweden, Ukraine, and the UK supported the proposal. The U.S. appreciated the work Germany had put into developing the proposal but requested additional time to study it, as did Brazil.

¶90. (C) Germany thanked Partners for the response and asked for any additional input by the end of 2007, so the issue could be discussed again at the 2008 RPOC meeting in Paris.

/////////
Denial Notifications
/////////

¶91. (C) Germany presented its revised proposal on denial notifications (POC 199) and urged its adoption. Ukraine supported the basic idea of the proposal but had questions on the modalities of the denial renewal process. These questions eventually were resolved in bilateral side meetings with the German delegation.

¶92. (C) After further consideration of the German proposal by Heads of Delegation, the Plenary adopted the following consensus language on denial notifications:

&Partners agreed in principle, subject to a silence procedure of 45 days, to apply, consistent with their national legislation, the &Best Practices for sharing and using Denial Information⁸ (MTCR/ATH/PL/025) as an outline for denial notification and use of denial information.

Partners agreed to develop the ePOC notification database in a way as to allow Partners to renew notifications online. The date of the latest renewal would appear in the database together with the notification concerned. Moreover, Partners agree to develop the ePOC database in a way as to allow Partners to trace revoked denials for a period of five years

after revocation. The date of revocation would appear in the database together with the notification concerned.⁸

NOTE: The U.S. confirmed in side meetings on the margins of the Plenary that the German paper on best practices for sharing and using denial information is intended only as a suggestion or guide for Partners. Its adoption is not mandatory and Partners should apply it as they choose in a manner consistent with national regulation and practice. END NOTE.

/////////
Brokering
/////////

¶93. (C) The ROK informed Partners of the successful brokering seminar it co-hosted with Australia in Seoul on March 22-23, 2007. The seminar focused on national and international responses to illicit brokering activities and concluded that there is a need for a sustained, multi-faceted response to such activities. Australia thanked the ROK for organizing the workshop and commended the meeting report to all Partners for their review.

////////////////////////////////////
Informing Non-Partners of Changes to the MTCR
////////////////////////////////////

¶94. (C) Outgoing Chair Per Fischer reminded Partners that several countries outside the Regime have asked to be informed immediately after the Plenary of any changes to the Guidelines and Annex. The Partners agreed that the Chair should directly inform non-member states, as well as the UNSCR 1540 Committee, of any changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex adopted in Athens.

/////////
Future Meetings
/////////

¶95. (C) INTERSESSIONAL MEETINGS: Per established procedures, Partners will decide at the January 2008 POC meeting whether to hold an intersessional TEM.

¶96. (U) PLENARY: The Partners accepted Australia's proposal to host the 2008 Plenary in Canberra and subsequently serve as MTCR Chair for 2008-2009.

¶97. (C) RPOC: The Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced Point of Contact meeting in Paris by no later than April 2008, with specific dates to be communicated by the POC.

////////////////////////////////////
LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS MEETING (LEEM)
////////////////////////////////////

¶98. (C) The MTCR held its eighth LEEM on November 5-7, 2007, with participation from customs, investigative, licensing, policy, and police officials. There were 18 presentations by seven MTCR Partner countries. The LEEM was co-chaired by Mr. Klass Leenman (The Netherlands) and Ms. Aggeliki Matsouka (Greece). U.S. presentations were made by Dave Manglos (DHS/ICE) and Scot Gonzales (Commerce Enforcement). Topics discussed included case studies on enforcement successes, case studies on Iranian missile- and UAV-related procurement efforts, end-user verification issues, interdiction, prosecuting proliferators, transshipment, and ITT and deemed exports.

¶99. (C) All LEEM participants agreed that LEEM meetings were beneficial and provided an opportunity to share information on key topics. They also agreed on the importance of continued joint sessions with the IE and TEM, and noted that the joint session with the IE had been particularly beneficial, especially with regard to the discussion on machine tools and brokering issues.

¶100. (C) It was reported that Canada is continuing to update the Enforcement Officers Handbook and hoped to have a revised draft coordinated through the LEEM Co-chairs and circulated to all Partners before the 2008 Plenary.

¶101. (C) Co-chair Leenman presented the final report of the LEEM to the Plenary on November 8. The Plenary took note of the report and endorsed the LEEM Chair,s recommendations.
NOTE: A detailed account of the LEEM and its recommendations can be found in the LEEM Co-chairs, report to the Plenary (POC 226). END NOTE.

/////////////////////////////////
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (IE)
/////////////////////////////////

¶102. (C) 11 Partners submitted a total of 46 papers for the Information Exchange (IE) held on November 5-7, 2007. The meeting was co-Chaired by the UK's John Andrews and Greece,s Theodora Paandreaou. ISN/MTR,s Ralph Palmiero and Josh Casker were the U.S. Reps. ONI,s Rachel Roll also presented for the U.S. Topics discussed in the IE included: missile proliferation trends, missile-related procurement, procurement networks, shipping trends, maritime proliferation, proliferation finance, brokering, emerging technologies, SLV/ballistic missile interchangeability, machine tools, composite materials, visa screening, end-user checks, ITT (intangible technology transfers), and UAV proliferation threats. The IE also discussed missile proliferation activities in the following countries and regions: China, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, the Middle East, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Syria.

NOTE: A detailed report on these discussions can be found in the IE Co-Chairs' Report to the Plenary (POC 225). END NOTE.

¶103. (C) IE presentations engendered an active exchange of views and information. Partners discussed at length ballistic missile and UAV developments in Iran, as well as the processes Iran employs to acquire key equipment and technology for its program. In this context, Partners were encouraged to exercise particular vigilance with regard to attempts to acquire guidance and control and propulsion technologies. Attention also was drawn to the increased use being made of the automotive industry as a cover for procurement efforts on behalf of Iran,s missile program. Finally, Partners discussed in detail the operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a key carrier of ballistic missile-related cargoes for Iran.

¶104. (C) Missile programs in China and North Korea also were discussed extensively, as were the role of brokers in illicit procurement and proliferators, use of transshipment points. Partners also were briefed on methods used in proliferation finance and the importance of using visa screening as a nonproliferation tool. Another key focus of the IE discussions was emerging technologies.

¶105. (C) The IE hosted the first ever joint session of the IE, LEEM, and TEM. Subjects discussed included emerging technologies, machine tools, proliferation finance, and brokering. Participants found the exchange highly valuable and urged that such joint sessions be continued, noting that sharing information on interdictions and national practices in key areas is extremely useful.

¶106. (C) IE Co-Chair John Andrews presented the final IE report to the Plenary on November 8. The Plenary took note of the report and generally praised the excellent work of the IE. The Plenary also reiterated the importance of circulating IE papers on ePOC at least one month in advance of the Plenary. In cases where classification does not permit papers to be circulated on ePOC, Partners should circulate a suitable synopsis.

/////////////////////////////////

Technical Experts Meeting (TEM)
////////////////////////////////////

¶107. (C) The TEM met November 1-6, 2007 to discuss a number of proposals for amending the MTCR Annex. ISN/MTR,s Kennedy Wilson led U.S. participation in the TEM. The TEM reached consensus on the following:

- The payload definition for &Other UAVs8 was amended in two areas to include munitions support and deployment structure.
- Terms in entries 2.A.1.B.1 and 2.A.1.b.2 were made consistent with other Item entries.
- The names of fuel substances in 4.C.2.b.3, 4.C.2.b.13, and 4.C.2.b.20 were changed to provide further precision.
- A new entry was created for an oxidizer substance useable in solid propellant rocket motors (4.C.4.b.5).
- The control text for two polymeric substances was clarified (4.C.5.a and 4.C.5.b).
- An editorial correction was applied to 4.C.6.a.3.
- Two notes were added to 4.C.6.a.5.
- The Technical Note for maraging steels (6.C.8) was clarified.
- The expression of the percentage of titanium content in Titanium-stabilized stainless steel was corrected (6.C.9.a.2).
- A new text clarifying vibration test modes was adopted (15.B.1.a.).
- The scope of 10.E.1 was extended to cover systems in 19.A.2.
- An Index provided for reference as a separate document from the Annex was created and will be updated consequent to each update of the Annex.

¶108. (C) In addition, the TEM discussed at length a U.S. proposal to significantly modify how the Regime controls UAVs and cruise missiles. However, despite the majority of Partners supporting the proposal, it did not gain consensus. Russia did not identify specific technical objections to the proposal but objected to it on principle. As an alternative, Russia proposed) during bilateral discussions -- a comprehensive zero-based review of the Regime,s control criteria, goals, and purpose for various classes of systems. Both Brazil and South Africa said they appreciated the new modified format of the U.S. proposal, but did not remove their reserves, although South Africa moved from reserve to study reserve. South Africa also proposed modified language for the stealth criterion and indicated it has additional unspecified concerns about the parameters in general that it would discuss if its stealth concerns were resolved. Privately, Brazilian officials indicated that they support the U.S. proposal, but are still working their interagency for approval. South Africa also indicated privately that it remains on reserve because of political concerns about isolating Russia.

¶109. (C) The Partners took note of the TEM report and endorsed the recommendations presented by the TEM Chair.

////////////////////////////////////
Other Business
////////////////////////////////////

¶110. (C) Brazil informed the Partners of the third UN Panel on Missiles. The panel had an organizational meeting in 2007, and will meet again in February and June 2008. Brazil is serving as panel chair, and hopes the panel will produce a good report.

¶111. (C) Russia also hoped the panel would produce a good assessment of the global missile picture and the challenges Partners face in this area. Russia thought the panel report would be a good starting point for the MTCR to begin assessing the global missile threat, with a view to identifying where the MTCR has been successful in addressing the threat and what more must be done to deal with new challenges. In Russia,s view, the MTCR needs to review where it is heading and what it needs to do to get there. Russia appealed to Partners to give careful thought to its suggestion and hoped that the seeds of its proposal would

find good soil and bear fruit in the future.

¶112. (C) Continuing, Russia said it is dissatisfied with the organization of the MTCR, especially the IE, and thinks there needs to be a review of how the Regime works. Russia is interested in improving the MTCR effectiveness, starting with the Plenary agenda. In Russia,s assessment, the Partners spent too much time in Athens talking about outreach and not enough time on serious matters. Russia wants to make sure that its views will be taken into account and that the Partners will focus on substance at the Canberra Plenary. Russia also hoped that Partners would think seriously about the information flow within the Regime, and take steps to fix it and thereby reduce tensions at the Plenary. In particular, Russia said, it is too much for the Russian delegation to be expected to handle all of the last minute papers. Plenary papers, especially IE papers, should be circulated at least one month in advance.

/////////
Closing Statements
/////////

¶113. (C) Portugal, on behalf of the EU and Norway, was disappointed that the Partners had failed to admit the newest EU countries to the Regime and urged the MTCR to give priority to this issue in the future. Ukraine fully supported the EU position.

¶114. (C) Outgoing Chair Fischer thanked Greece for its outstanding hospitality and leadership in organizing the Plenary. The UK echoed these sentiments, adding a thank you for all the behind-the-scenes staff that made the Plenary a success.

/////////
Press Statement
/////////

¶115. (U) The Partners adopted the following press statement for release at the conclusion of the Athens Plenary:

&Press Release
MTCR Plenary: Athens
7-9 November 2007

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 22nd Plenary Meeting in Athens from 7 to 9 November 2007 to review its activities and further strengthen its efforts to prevent missile proliferation. The Plenary was opened by H.E. Mr. Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, Secretary General for European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, and chaired by Ambassador Eleftherios Danellis who was confirmed as Chair of the MTCR until the next Plenary.

Partners exchanged information and discussed trends in missile developments around the world and acknowledged the growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In particular, they expressed concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia South Asia, and the Middle East and reaffirmed their determination to strengthen export controls, thereby discouraging missile programmes and activities of proliferation concern.

Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security Council resolutions, inter alia, 1718, 1737 and 1747 to MTCR export controls and expressed their determination to implement these resolutions and to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD ballistic missile programmes of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law.

Partners agreed on practical measures, including exchange of information, inter alia, on entities and non-listed goods of proliferation concern and called on all States to take all necessary steps at a national level to fully and effectively implement the missile relevant provisions of these

resolutions.

The Plenary discussed extensively the rapid changes in relevant technology which demand the MTCR to continuously adapt in order to maintain the accuracy and comprehensiveness of its focus on curtailing the missile proliferation threat. A number of proposals on this subject were discussed. The Plenary agreed on changes to the list of controlled goods (the Annex).

In a broader context, the Plenary reiterated its support for UN Security Council resolution 1540 declaring proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery a threat to international peace and security and obliging all UN Member States to exercise effective export controls over such weapons and related materials. It reaffirmed the willingness of Partners in a position to do so to assist non-member states, as foreseen in the resolution, and that the Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.

Since its establishment in 1987 the MTCR has made significant contributions to the international non-proliferation effort. The 34 Partners (see below) of the MTCR have established an international export control standard which is increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR. Partners welcomed the growing awareness of the need for export controls and the expressed interest by many States in cooperating with the MTCR. They confirmed their intention individually and through the outreach activities of the Chair to consult and cooperate with non-members to promote effective export controls over missiles and missile technology. The Greek Chair was mandated to conduct outreach activities with a diverse range of non-member States.

Partners welcomed Australia's offer to host the next MTCR Plenary Meeting in the second half of 2008 and to take on the chairmanship of the Regime for the subsequent term of office.

Further information on the MTCR can be found at www.mtc.info

Partners of the MTCR: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.⁸

/////////
Bilateral Meetings
/////////

¶116. (C) The U.S. delegation held bilateral meetings with several countries on the margins of the November Plenary meeting:

Australia (11/06): The U.S. and the UK exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership, and the U.S. proposals on Iranian front companies and outreach. The U.S. also briefed Australia on the results of recent bilateral talks with India on export control issues, and discussed in detail MTCR procedures and operations. In addition, the U.S. answered numerous questions about the how to's of organizing a Plenary and volunteered to be a resource for Australia in the coming year.

France (11/07): The U.S. and France exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/CM proposal, the U.S. proposal on outreach and Iranian front companies, two Russian proposals on a comprehensive review of the MTCR and globalizing the INF treaty, and the EU proposal on Iran.

Germany (11/04): The U.S and Germany exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership and outreach, Germany,s proposals on denial notifications and end-use controls.

Greece (11/05): The U.S and Greece exchanged views on Plenary agenda items and Plenary management strategies.

Japan (11/06): The U.S and Japan exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership, and outreach.

Russia (11/05): The U.S. and Russia exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/CM proposal, membership, and the U.S. proposal on Iranian front companies. Russia also discussed its interest in circulating the U.S.-Russia joint statement on INF.

South Africa (11/06): The U.S. and South Africa exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, outreach, and the U.S. proposal on Iranian front companies.

UK (11/04): The U.S and the UK exchanged views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, the UK proposal on payload substitution, membership, and the U.S. proposals on Iranian front companies and outreach. The U.S. also briefed the UK on the results of recent bilateral talks with India on export control issues.

NOTE: The TEM delegation also held separate, TEM-specific bilats with Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, and the UK. END NOTE.

/////////////////
DELEGATION MEMBERS
/////////////////

¶117. (C) The U.S. delegation was led by ISN Acting DAS Amb. Donald A. Mahley. Other delegation members were: Pam Durham (ISN/MTR), Ralph Palmiero, (ISN/MTR), Josh Casker (ISN/MTR), Kennedy Wilson (ISN/MTR), Steve Clagett (DOC/BIS), Dennis Krepp (DOC/BIS), Chantal Laktos (DOC/BIS), Jamie Fly (OSD/TNT), Charlie Stubbs (JCS/J-5), Jesse Crump (DOD), Timothy Williams (OSD), Geoffrey Buescher (DOD), Anatoli Welihozikiy (DOE), Scot Gonzales (DOC/OEE), Dave Manglos (DHS/ICE), Rachel Roll (Navy), Helen Smith (Embassy Paris), Jeffrey Hovenier and Starr Small (Embassy Athens).
RICE